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EUROPEAN SOCIALISM. THE WESTERN ALLIANCE AND CENTRAL AMERICA:
LOST (LATIN AMERICAN) ILLUSIONS?

Carlos Rico F.

1.- Introduction.

The Central American crisis has become a particularly interesting
terrain in which to analyze some of the "new realities" which characterize
relations between the United States and other Western countries in the
eighties. New realities indeed: an area of the world which until quite
recently had such a low place in the agenda of international politics,
U.S. foreign policy or even Interamerican relations that the Assistant
Secretary of State for Latin American affairs in the early seventies
devoted no more than 3% of his time to it1 used as a case study to
characterize much wider changes. That this is even possible is a result,
basically, of two developments.

The first one is related precisely to the place which this area had in
the context of international politics for most of this century as an
almost undisputed North American preserve, in which other Western
countries (with the exception of Britain's presence in Belize) had quite
limited interests. Central America was not only the subregion of Latin
America where the dominant presence of the United States was originally

William D. Rogers, "U.S. behavior and European Apprehensions", in
Joseph Cirincione (Ed.): Central America and the Western Alliance (New
York: Holmes & Meier, 1985).

established but also one of the first areas of the world in which
Europeans accepted a leading role on the part of the emerging new world
power. Thus, while the presence of European governments and nongovernmental forces was quite open in South America during the interwar
decades, the same was not the case in the isthmus, where the U.S. was able
to develop an almost unchallenged presence even during its isolationist
years. After the Second World War, while Latin America as a whole saw its
international alternatives dwindle, Central America was confirmed as what
I have called elsewhere an area of U.S. "hyperhegemony".2

The contrast between that reality and the present proliferation of
international actors which, one way or another, have participated in the
difficult process of transition launched by the 1979 triumph of the
Sandinist Front of National Liberation in Nicaragua is indeed remarkable.
And what makes this relevant to understand intra-West relations, in
particular in the sphere of security perceptions, is the fact that among
those new actors other Western governments, both from Europe and from
Latin America have played important roles.

The second development is in turn related to the direction that such
new participation has taken. Both the governments of the largest Latin
American governments and several Western European public and private
forces have been openly critical of the policies pursued by the Reagan
Carlos Rico F. "Common Concerns and National Interests: The
Contadora Experience and the Prospects for Collective Security
Arrangements in the Western Hemisphere", paper prepared for the World
Peace Foundation's Project on Collective Security in the Western
Hemisphere, 1987.

Administration in the area, refusing to let the leadership role of the
North Americans to be taken for granted. This has given rise to an
interesting paradox in which at the same time that the U.S. government
publicly bases its policy prescriptions to deal with the crisis on the
defense of Western interests that it says are threatened by the Soviet
Union and its allies, those other governments whose interests are also
supposedly being defended refuse to share that perception of threat. In
fact, those other Western countries seem to have some times perceived
threats to their interests that emanates not from Soviet actions but from
North American behavior in the area.

From a Latin American perspective there are other reasons, not directly
connected to the problem of security perceptions but equally compelling,
to carefully examine the extent of European involvement in the Central
American crisis. They are in turn related to the possibility of taking
that crisis, for precisely the same reasons that I have already
summarized, as an example of the more general trends towards a more
policentric international order in which new alternatives may be open for
them. Since at least the end of the sixties, most goverments of the
region have attempted, with diverse results, to "break out" of the Western
hemisphere and develop new alternatives which may increase their
international bargaining power.3

Laurence Whitehead, "Debt, Diversification and Dependency: Latin
America's International Political Relations", in Kevin Middlebrook and
Carlos Rico (Ed.): The United States and Latin America in the 1980's:
Contending Pers~ectiveson a Decade of Crisis (Pittsburg: Pittsburgh
University Press, 1986).

These Latin American efforts to "diversify dependency" have been widely
chronicled. Two limitations of most of this literature must be noted in
connection to the topic of this essay. In the first place the emphasis has
been usually put on their economic dimensions. Secondly, increases in
contacts between the region and extra-hemispheric powers are usually seen
as the result of Latin American initiatives. Important aspects of the
problem are thus frequently overlooked. Such is the case of the political
dimensions of such diversification, not only in terms of the posibilities
for restricted political alliances with governments beyond the Western
Hemisphere, but also in terms of the c'ontacts and mutual support which may
be developed between different political forces of various Western
countries. A second dimension not always adequately covered is related to
the role that those alternative poles of relation, in this case the
Europeans, may play (and have played in some instances) in the context of
those efforts at rapprochement.

This essay tries to look at European involvement in Latin American
affairs and its implications for perceptions in the sphere of security by
taking the Central American crisis as an example of the potential
disagreements which may crop up among Western countries in that issue
area. With this in mind I focus my attention on a set of European
political actors which are, at the same time, squarely within the
parameters of what we may define as "the West", and most likely to place a
different emphasis in their examination of security related questions:
European Social Democrats. In examining them I will concentrate most of my
attention on the international forum in which they participate (the

Socialist International) but I will also make some references to specific
actions by national parties and even by governments in those cases where
Socialist parties have been in power during the years of the Central
American crisis.

The basic theme to'be

developed in this essay is centered around the

expectations which the activism displayed by some of these forces awakened
both in Europe and in Latin America in terms of its potential for creating
a bridge between Latin American security perceptions and the key concerns
shared in that issue-area by the main participants in the Western
Alliance.

I take three steps in presenting my argument. The first section of the
essay recapitulates the main antecedents to the European socialist's
involvement in the Central American sub-region and more generally in Latin
American affairs. The next part of the paper summarizes the main reasons
that account for the expectations that were raised as a result of that
participation. The third one examines their role in the context of the
Central American crisis, focusing on their disagreements with the Reagan
Administration. Finally I present a preliminary evaluation of the present
state of European social democratic activities in connection with the
Central American crisis and the potential for some increased participation
by them in other issue areas and other parts of the region. Thus, after
devoting the body of the essay to recording the main reasons that may be
given to justify the hopes raised by such increased activism in the area I
concentrate my final considerations on the subsequent dampening of those

expectations.

2.- Euro~eanSocialist Parties and Latin America: From the Years of
Solitude to Increased Attention in Times of Crisis.

In a well known process which has its roots in the mid-nineteen century
and in particular in the creation of the Second International in 1889, and
its latter development, European political forces which posited socialism
as their objective gradually became divided into two main currents. The
communist movement, the first one of those tendencies, was increasingly
perceived after the Russian Revolution of 1917 as closely tied to what was
to become the main international competitor of the U.S. and as such
attracted a fair deal of attention of students of international relations.

The second current, social democracy, attracted less attention among
I.R. scholars, in particular in the United States. It was formed by those
political parties and movements which, in their original thinking, argued
that socialism could be achieved through the reform of capitalism, and
which placed high value in the preservation, and expansion, of the
political achievements of liberal democracy. Gradually these forces came
to emphasize the reform of existing social, economic and political
structures rather than their radical transformation.

Both of these movements developed international connections in other
parts of the world. However, an interesting difference between them came

to be apparent in the first decades of the XXth century in terms of their
ability to take roots in the less developed areas of the planet. While
communist ideology developed in parts of Asia and Latin America, social
democracy remained as basically a European phenomenon in spite of the
efforts of different metropolitan socialist parties to promote the
creation of like-minded political movements in the European colonies of
the day.

This basic difference is particularly apparent in Latin America.
According to one of the foremost historians of socialist thought, the
region did not play an important role in any of the branches of the
socialist movement at least until after the First World war

However, by

the second decade of this century several communist parties were active in
the area. On the other hand, for most of this century there has been only
a very small number of parties formally affiliated with those
organizations in which social democrats have joined forces. The most
prominent exceptions to this situation in the early decades of the century
were the socialist parties of Argentina and Uruguay which, after
participating in the activities of the Second International, maintained
their limited connections with their European counterparts. Political
forces from both Brazil and Chile sporadically participated in those
international efforts.5

G.D.H. Cole: Historia del Pensamiento Socialista (Mkxico: Fondo de
Cultura Econ6mica, 1974), Vol IV, p. 273.
Ibid.

The difficult period social democracy went through from the beginning
of the First World War until the mid forties can be seen as one of the
causes of that situation. The reorganization of the international social
democratic movement that culminates in 1951 with the creation of the
Socialist International prepared the ground for a new period of
international activity by European social democratic parties, several of
which came to power in their respective countries. Such potential,
however, was not fully developed until some years latter.

The attempt to find a "third way" between the dominant socioeconomic
systems of the postwar world and the mixture of political liberalism,
social and economic reformism and quite open anticomunism that
characterized the early statements of principles of the organization had a
double impact. They on the one hand alienated a good part of socialist
forces in the world, which tended to perceive social democrats as too
close to U.S. positions in the Cold War confrontation and, on the other,
attracted the attention of several political forces in the underdeveloped
areas of the world which were themselves trying to gain some distance from
both superpowers.

The force of this attraction and the priority that social democrats
gave to expanding it were limited during the fifties and sixties, by three
sets of factors: (a) the perceived alignment of European socialism behind
the United States, (b) the position taken by several European socialist
parties during the process of decolonization which dominated North-South
relations during that period and (c) the fact that during those years the

problems of European reconstruction were at the top of the list of
priorities of most political forces in that area of the world.

Two different developments took place as those limiting circumstances
changed. In the first place, once decolonization was basically completed
and the Cold War started to melt down the potential appeal of the key
aspects of European social democratic thinking for other regions of the
world became increasingly apparent. Secondly, as their economic woes
lessened, the attention devoted by the Europeans to relations with
countries of the underdeveloped world other than their own colonies
increased. A happy coincidence of circumstances took place and the efforts
formally introduced by the Socialist International to stop being only
"western and whitew6 found a much better ground for expression under those
conditions. In the next section of this essay I summarize some of the more
particular reasons why European social democracy appealed to important
segments of the Latin American political spectrum as a potential element
in their international activities. At this point my interest is in
recording the slow process of increased relations between European Social
Democracy and Latin American political forces.

The road to increased Latin American participation in social
democratic international activities was long. Not only were there
relatively few political forces in the region which openly shared the

Karl-Ludwig ~ ~ n s c hand
e K. Lantermann: Historia de la
Internacional Socialista (MBxico: Nueva Imagen, 1979). Pp. 190-191. Quoted
in Felicity Williams: La Internacional Socialista v America Latina
(MBxico: Universidad Autonoma Metropolitana-Azcapotzalco, 1984). P. 106.

stated thinking of the movement but during the fifties and sixties
European social democratic parties concentrated their limited efforts to
develop a "Third World constituency", as I have already suggested, in
their former colonies. Such efforts, on the other hand, were to bear very
limited fruits, which in turn became one of the reasons for the attention
paid to Latin America in later years.

When the Socialist International was created in 1951 only two political
parties of the region, again those of Argentina and Uruguay, were listed
among its members. Jamaican socialists joined the International in 1952
and in 1955 a Latin American Secretariat of the organization was
established in

monte vide^,^

in which the Chilean Popular Socialist Party

also participated. Acording to Felicity Williams, in its first six years
the Secretariat was "in touch" with Socialist parties of Brazil, Ecuador,
Panama and Peru, Colombia's Popular Socialist Party, Cuba's socialist
Federation and the 26th of July movement, Democratic Action in Venezuela,
Costa Rica's National Liberation Party, Peru's APRA, Bolivia's MNR,
Paraguay's Partido Revolucionario Febrerista, the United Front of the
Dominican Republic, in exile, and diverse European exile communities in
Mexico.9

All this, however, did not bring noticeable changes to a situation
Felicity Williams op. cit. P. 90.
Michael Lowy, "Trayectoria de la Internacional Socialista en
America Latina", Cuadernos Politicos Num. 29. July- September 1981.
Felicity Williams OD. cit. Pages 194-195.

characterized by the almost total lack of interest on the part of the
European socialist parties in relation to the 1954 coup in Guatemala and
the denounced U.S. participation in that event.1° The Latin American
Secretariat tried to steer a middle course between military dictatorships
which in many cases were openly supported by the U.S. and the communist
parties of the region whose militants were increasingly influenced by the
example of the Cuban revolution after 1959. This was not easy in the
context of the sixties, when the impact of the Cuban revolutionary
process, on the one hand, and the commitment of many reformist forces to
the U.S. sponsored Alliance for Progress, on the other, left a very
limited space to social democrats who would emphasize a European
connection.

It is, however, in the context of the early sixties that political
parties from four Latin American countries (Costa Rica, Paraguay, Peru and
Venezuela) joined the International as observers, showing an increase in
interest which led to the transformation of the Latin American Secretariat
into a Liason Bureau in 1966. By the end of that decade Latin American
parties linked to the organization constituted its second largest
geographic component.

It is during the late sixties that the increased attention paid by the
European social democrats to relation with the developing world picks up
speed. Several factors are involved in that change. A first element is the
modified tone of international politics introduced by the German Federal
lo Michael Lowy OD. cit. page 38.

Republic's ostpolitik.

In this sense a second element which it seems

necessary to bring into the analysis is related to the resurgence of the
German social democratic party in the politics of its own country in the
last years of the sixties.

Germany had two characteristics which helped it develop a leading role
in the "Third World policiesw of the Socialist International. The first
one was related to the key role that German socialists had played in the
movement in the years when it was still a part of the Second
International. This leading role was confirmed with the influential
participation that the SPD had in the process of revising social
democratic ideology in the early fifties. Its Bad Godesberg program, made
public in 1951 was very influential in the process of recreation of the
International during the same year. The second factor had to do with the
lack of former colonial possessions- a characteristic they shared with
their Northern European counterparts- which imposed relatively fewer
constraints in their behavior in relation to that of countries such as
France or Great Britain.

The West Germans gave also several examples of the disagreements of
important components of European social democratic parties with different
aspects of U.S. foreign policy which were also to have an important role
in their increased activism. Those disagreements, on the other hand,
basically expressed concerns which were also relevant in other countries.
Thus, the role that the German social democratic youth (the Jusos) played
in prompting their party to a more activist role in "Third World affairs"

was clearly influenced by an event which had an important impact in youth
movements throughout the world: the Vietnam war.

Other factors pushed in the same direction. In the context of the
international economic difficulties of the early seventies, and in
particular as a result of the first energy crisis, European governments,
many of which were are at that point under the control of social
democratic parties, intensify the attention they pay to "Third World
matters".

There were other, more particular, reasons for the increased attention
that these European forces started to pay to Latin America in the context
of their renewed attention to "Third World mattersn. Their emphasis on a
kind of reformist welfare-statism seemed at that point to be domestically
more viable in Latin America than in other areas of the underdeveloped
world. This reflected the perception that some countries in the region
were approaching the ranks of a "middle class of nations" , for which
economic restrictions on reformism would be less acute. Even on purely
economic grounds there were reasons for Latin America to attract European
attention well beyond social democratic circles. The region was seen at
the same time as a vast potential market, the most industrialize region of
the developing world, an area rich in mineral and energy resources and
apotential supply of relatively qualified but cheap labor.l1 And if all
this was not enough, Latin America itself was committed to developing

l1 Jenny Pearce "Introduction" to The Euro~eanChallenge: Euro~e
's
New Role in Latin America (London: Latin America Bureau, 1982). P. 6.

alternative poles of relation beyond the Western hemisphere and, for
reasons which are discussed in the next section of this essay considered
the European social democrats as an attractive option.

Three other factors contribute to draw the picture. The more general
assertion of European interests during those years vis a vis the United
States also contributed to the increase in reciprocal interest. The
flexibility with which the International began to approach such thorny
issues as the notion of political democracy members had to abide by
certainly eased matters even more, in particular in relation to political
parties which had their roots in populist movements seen in some cases by
the European socialists as related to their own experiences with fascism.
Finally, the important role that the Socialist parties of Spain and
Portugal started to play in Socialist International circles after the fall
of the last remnants of European fascism added a new element to the
attention that Latin America could expect to receive in those same
circles.

In the early seventies all these developments had created a set of very
favorable conditions for the rapprochement between European social
democracy and those forces which one could associate with Latin America's
"democratic left". The 1971-73 experience of the Popular Unity government
in Chile was the final element needed to catalize that interest. Several
aspects of that experience contributed to increase European social
democratic interest in Latin America. Chile's "electoral road to
socialism" had attracted the attention of socialist political forces

worldwide practically from the moment of Allende's triumph.

For the social democrats it assumed a particularly important meaning
since it seemed to prove that peaceful processes of transition were
possible even in less developed areas of the world. Since "la via chilena"
openly aimed at not only reforming existing structures but at the
"building of socialism" itself it also tended to capture the imagination
of European political actors who perceived themselves as constrained by
the political realities of their own countries to go "that far". The
appeal of the Chilean experiment for these forces had several concrete
expressions.Thus, the first time that the Bureau of the Socialist
International met in Latin American soil took place in Santiago de Chile,
during Feruary, 1973.

The assasination of President Allende, the September 1973 coup and the
levels that repression reached in the country in its wake galvanized the
attention not only of European socialists but of wider segments of
European and world public opinion. The Church Commission's U.S. Senate
investigation on the role of the North American government in the deestabilization of the Chilean government, in turn, increased the gap in
the security perceptions of U.S. political elites and significant parts of
the European political spectrum which saw many parts of the Chilean
deposed coalition as their own. The words that America Ghioldi, exiled
member of the Argentine Socialist Party, had used in his report on Latin
America to the 1955 International Socialist Congress would find a more
receptive audience almost 20 years later: "With pathetic blindness- he had

stated- that great country [the United States C.R.], claiming strategic
reasons has provided arms to dictators who use them against their own
peoples.n 12

In more than one sense, the fight against the Chilean military
dictatorship supported by the United States would take on for a new
generation of European socialists the flavor of something similar to the
anti- fascist struggles that those social democratic militants who were
themselves in charge of both the movement and their national parties by
the early seventies had fought a quarter century before in their own
countries. As other South American countries joined Chile in the road to
authoritarianism the International's scope of attention on Latin America
was widened.

In the second half of the seventies Latin America was second only to
Europe itself as the area where the S.I. had more contacts, and its
importance increased in the agenda of a movement which declared itself
committed to changing its well deserved eurocentric image. The last years
of the decade witnessed a series of high level meetings between important
leaders of the movement and their Latin American counterparts, as well as
the extension of Latin American participation to such political forces as
Mexico's PRI, Brazil's MDB and El Salvador's MNR. The elections in the
Dominican Republic at the end of the decade provided the International
with a first case in which the possibility of concrete actions beyond

l2 As quoted in Felicity Williams: op. cit. P. 125.
16

declarations was validated.l3

The XIV Congress of the International, held in Vancouver, Canada in
November of 1978, represents the high water mark of the SI's Latin
American involvement prior to the Central American crisis. Over twenty
Latin American political parties and movements attended the Congress,
This in a sense
among them the Sandinist Front of National ~iberati0n.l~
symbolized the role that the sub-regional conflict would play as a key
stimulus to those tendencies towards a greater European socialist
involvement in Latin American issues that I have summarized. The crisis in
fact became the new focus of European social democratic activities in the
region during the eighties. Before examining the role of European social
democrats in Central America, however I will present some of the factors
which contributed, on the Latin American side to give those efforts a warm
welcome.

3.- Too high hoves? Latin American Expectations and Eurovean
Social Democracv.

Within Latin America's efforts at diversification Western Europe has
l3 Pierre Schori: El desafio euroveo en CentroamBrica (San Jos6:
Editorial Universitaria Centroamericana, 1982). Pages 251-254.
l4 Nueva Sociedad, Num.39, November/December 1979. P.12 It is
interesting to note that Granada's New Jewel Movement also requested
admission in the International, and that it was accepted in 1980. Also in
1980 a request for membership presented by Nicaragua's Movimiento
Democratico Nicaraguense, headed by Alfonso Robelo, was denied.

occupied a very important place. This is true in the economicparticularly regarding trade- realm, but even more so in the political
one. This is a reflection, both of the perception that Latin American
political elites have of themselves and their countries as belonging to
Western culture and civilization and of an extremely important reality:
the terms of political debate in the region have interesting parallels
with those which dominate in Europe. The reception given to European
social democratic activities in the area has to be framed in this
context.

Laurence Whitehead has pointed out how the differences between the U.S.
government and the governments of Western Europe in terms of their
"contrasting histories, their distinctive geopolitical roles, and their
present differences of political structure...give rise to marked
variations of conduct and motive. "I5 Without trying to take the comparison
too far it may be proposed that there are some key points in which the
terms of political debate in both Europe and Latin America are at the same
time less "exceptional" than those of the United States and more similar
between them. Thus, in both cases there is both a tradition of more
Burkean conservatism and an active presence of Marxism as an important
component of the worldviews of important segments of their public debate.

As a result of these factors it frequently &ems

to be easier for Latin

l5 Laurence Whitehead, "International Aspects of Democratization", in
Guillermo OWDonnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence whitehead (Eds.)
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Com~arativePers~ectives(Baltimore:
The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986). P. 10.

Americans to interact with European political forces than with those of
the United States or even of other regions which in fact may be seen as
very important poles of relations in the economic sphere, such as Japan.
There is one aspect of all this that is particularly relevant in
connection to the attitudes of European social democrats in the Central
American crisis. Even if social democratic parties have many times
officially abandoned Marxism in their official declarations, the
conceptual framework of this school of thought is not alien to the mind
sets of many among their own militants. This many times helps in the
development of a more understanding attitude vis a v i s movements in other
countries which may use that language in particular in comparison to the
one which usually emanates from North American political elites. European
social democrats seem to be better disposed to separate rethoric from
reality in those cases, in particular if they do not involve their own
former colonies.

There are other reasons for the optimism with which European actions
were received in "democratic left" circles in Latin America. The link
between the lessening of East-West tensions in the early seventies and the
increasing appeal of social democracy as an international movement is
particularly important to note in the context of this essay. It is in fact
interesting to point out that both detente and the renewed international
activism of the Socialist International in "Third World affaairs" were
closely tied to the same individual who played a key role in their
launching, first as Foreign Minister and Chancellor of the German Federal
Republic and, after 1976, as chairman of the Socialist International:

.

Willy Brandt l6

The particular situation of Latin America in relation to both European
decolonization and the East-West conflict gave a clearly dominant role to
developments that took place in the second of those issue areas. After
all, with the exception of some Caribbean islands and parts of Latin
America's Atlantic coast which have been perceived both by international
observers and by Latin Americans themselves as constituting separate
realities, the problems associated with European colonization had been
settled at a much earlier stage. This certainly helps the Europeans to
maintain a more relaxed attitude in relation to events that take place in
this area of the world rather than in their own spheres of immediate
influence and its impact should not be discounted.
-a

In my opinion, however, more weight should be assigned to the easing of
East-West tensions in the late sixties and early seventies. The bipolar
realities of the postwar world had had a particularly peculiar impact on
Latin America, where being a part of the Western world and the United
States' "back yard" many times seemed to be the two sides of the same
coin. This was, of course, particularly bothersome to those political
forces which were at the same time committed to reform and national selfdetermination and committed to essentially capitalist development
programs. Finding alternatives, economic and political, within the West
became an increasing concern for them. And once the automatic allignement
of European social democracy with the United States on most international
l6 Pierre Shori, OD. cit.
20

issues crucial to the region was removed in the context of detente, it
became increasingly attractive to those same forces.

In addition, European economic presence was limited17 and in fact was
seen more as an alternative to U.S. complete domination than as a threat
to sovereignty or national control over economic resources. This tended to
diminish the concerns that the previous history of European economic
involvement in the area may have raised. As Jenny Pearce has put it:
"Latin America's traditional economic and political dependence on the
United States and the strong resentment this has created within the
region, have encouraged many to look positively toward European
involvement".l8 Thus, even if there were no differences in the substance
of European activities in the region, the evaluation that Latin American
elites made of them tended to emphasize their positive dimensions. But
there were other factors involved in this welcome.

There was a perception, for example, that the Europeans were more
willing to accommodate Latin American concerns in key areas of interest to
the region than the North Americans had proven to be. Some antecedents in
this regard dated back to the early seventies and the economic
negotiations which dominated North-South relations during those years. I
l7 A good summary of the limited economic presence of key European
countries in the region is presented in Esperanza Durdn: Euro~ean
Interests in Latin America (London: The Royal Institute of International
Affairs, 1985). See also Sistema Econ6mico Latinoamericano: America Latina
y la Comunidad Econ6mica E u ~ o D ~Problemas
~:
v Pers~ectivas(Caracas: Monte
Avila Editores, 1983).
l8 Jenny Pearce, OD. cit. P. 7.

have already made a reference to the increased attention to "Third World
issues" that the economic problems of the early seventies helped spark on
the part of European social democrats. Looked at from the other side of
the table, that participation raised some expectations, connected to the
fact that some of the European governments who took a leading role in
North-South negotiations, in particular the social democratic ones,
adopted a conciliatory tone which clearly contrasted with the first
responses of the Nixon and Ford administrations in the United States to
the demands of the developing countries. That response raised Latin
American expectations regarding the role that European social democrats
could play in the region's efforts to attain a more balanced set of
international connections.

Some of the reasons behind that difference in European social
democratic attitudes with respect to those held by U.S. elites are not
difficult to point out. The kind of reformist welfare-statism promoted by
the social democrats made them more pliable to demands for a "new
international economic order" which dominated North-South discussions in
the early seventies, taking the place that the struggle for decolonization
had had before in that regard. In addition several of the social
democratic parties governed over countries that had had a very limited
colonial experience and carried less legacies from such a history. The
role that the Northern European parties played in the global context of
those negotiations can be related to this factor, for example.

Latin America had played, through countries such as Brazil, Mexico and

Venezuela an important role in such efforts and the compromising attitude
taken by the most important European social democratic leaders in such
fora as the Brandt Commission was well received in the region.19

A second area in which the perceptions of European social democrats
seemed to clearly differ from those of U.S. political elites was related
to the question of economic, social and political change in the area, and
particularly to its sources and likely direction. European social
democrats tended to give more emphasis to the nationalistic aspects of
those struggles than their North American counterparts. Such differences
are openly aired in a letter to Willy Brandt by swedish social democrat
Olof Palme. That letter summarized the view of the "U.S. connection" in
relation to the Chilean coup of the early seventies which came to prevail
in social democratic circles, but clearly had wider implications:

The United States seem unable to understand
and face in a constructive fashion the process
of liberation which is already underway in
the Latin American subcontinent. The position
taken by the Americans in relation to the
struggle of the Latin American peoples for
freedom is as narrowminded and myopic as the
one they took in the cases of China and Vietnam
with people like Mao Tse Tung and Ho Chi Minh.
The United States always feel threatened when a
poor people fights for its national and social
liberation, but that liberation is both
necessary and unavoidable.20

l9 Jacqueline Roddick and Philip OIBrien, "Europe and Latin America
in the Eighties", in The Euro~eanChallenge...

20 Willy Brandt, Bruno Kreisky and Olof Palme: La Alternativa
socialdem6crata (Barcelona: Blurne, 1977). P. 128.

A third area of differing perceptions between the U.S. and European
Social democrats tended to bring the latter nearer the viewpoints of the
Latin American "democratic left". Its subject matter was the weight and
interpretation which should be given to Soviet actions in connection to
Third World instability. At least in part that disagreement reflected the
different international roles of the different allies. European social
democrats tended to take a "regionalist" view, while the U.S. government
in a tendency that was reinforced as the Reagan administration startedfavored a more "globalist" one. The basic differences between one and the
other have been adequately summarized by Karel E. Vosskuler:
the regional approach accepts and values
the continuing diffusion of power,
appreciates the unique nature of the various
regional alignments, assumes rather limited
objectives behind Soviet policies in most Third World
areas, relies heavily upon diplomatic and economic
initiatives, favours maximum dissociation from regional
conflicts and relies rather more on multilateral
diplomacy, particularly within the framework of the
United Nations ...the globalist approach ...tends to
situate Third World conflict in an East-West context,
assumes global aspirations on the part of the Soviet
leadership, relies heavily on military force, attaches
great value to formal alliances and, at the same time,
shows a preference for bilateral diplomacy.21

A last area in which Latin American and European perceptions would come
close in the context of the Central American crisis was in turn related to
the similar roles that the largest Latin American countries and some of
their European counterparts played as "medium-powers" in international
politics. This was particularly important in relation to the emphasis they

21 Karel E. ~osskijhler,"The EEC and the USA: Differing PoliticoEconomic Approaches", in Christopher Stevens (Ed.): EEC and the Third
World: A Survey, Vol 3: The Atlantic Rift (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1983).

put on the value of international law and accepted principles of
international behavior as constraining factors of superpower activity, a
factor that would become particularly relevant as the "low intensity
warfare" directed at the Sandinista regime heated uu in the mid-eighties.

As can be seen, there were interesting antecedents to the position that
European social democrats were to take in relation to the Central American
crisis. The description of that position constitutes the focus of the next
section of this essay.

4.-Romancing the Revolution: Euro~eanSocialism and the Central
American Crisis.

There are some more specific elements of background to the kinds of
positions taken by European social democrats in connection to the
Sandinist revolution and, more generally, the Central American crisis. The
first set is related to the fact itself that Central America is an area of
the world were there are practically no European vital interests at stake.
The second, in turn, to the initial response by parties affiliated to the
Socialist International to the Cuban revolution in the late fifties. In
that instance most of them reacted quite positively, even if with the
increased radicalization of the process that initial enthusiasm tended to
wane after 1961. Those social democratic forces which in Europe and
elsewhere kept an open mind in relation to the Cuban revolution many times
based their position on the perception that such process of radicalization
and the growing ties that the Cuban revolution established with the Soviet

block were the result of misguided policies on the part of the U.S.
government.

A final set of background elements which must be taken into account is
related to the role that different Central American political actors and
issues had played in the activities of the Socialist International even
before the Sandinist revolution. I will call these "Central American
elements of background". The difficult balances that European social
democracy has had to maintain in the context of the crisis were in a sense
announced by the kinds of connections it developed over the years in the
sub- region.

I have already mentioned the fact that Costa Rica's Liberaci6n
Nacional had become an observer in the International as of 1966. The Costa
Rican party had established a School of Political Education for young
Latin American political leaders and union officials in 1959, which in
1968 changed its name to Centro de Estudios Democraticos de America Latina
and became increasingly linked to the West German social democratic
foundation, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung. LiberaciBn had become, even
before the explosion of the Central American crisis, one of the most
important Latin American associates of the International.

A second Central American element of background is related to the
political support that European social democrats gave to the anti-Somoza
struggle in Nicaragua. During the late seventies the Somoza dictatorship
in Nicaragua, along with the military regimes of Guatemala, had become

preferred targets for the social democrats, who tended to see them as the
worst examples of the mistaken policies that the U.S. was perceived as
pursuing in Latin America as a whole. The XI11 Congress of the
International which took place in late 1976 condemned human rights abuses
in Guatemala and Nicaragua, as well as Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, the
Dominican Republic, Paraguay and Uruguay.

Nicaragua caught an increasing share of attention as the situation of
that country deteriorated at the end of the decade. Venezuela's Accidn
Democrdtica and Costa Rica's Liberacidn Nacional contributed to this focus
on Nicaragua. During 1978 the Socialist International demanded the
cessation of "all arms shipments for the Somocista forces, in particular
those coming from the United States" and offered "the support of its
member parties for those groups within Nicaragua which are resisting the
Somoza government as well as immediate assistance to a succesor
government in its task of reconstruction".22

A final Central American element of background makes reference to the
fact that important figures of the Salvadoran democratic left, which after
the disappointing performance of the first two military juntas created in
that country after the October 1979 coup joined the armed insurgents, had

22 Statements of the Secretary General of the organization, B.
Carlsson made on the 13 and 21 of September of 1978 and reprodoced in
Socialist Affairs, Num.6, 1978. p. 171. Quoted in Williams: OD. cit. Pages
251 and 252.

become by the late seventies formal officials of the organization.23 The
incorporation of the MNR as an observer in the Socialist International,
another point of contact between those components of the Salvadoran
democratic left which joined the armed insurrection and European social
democrats, has already been mentioned.

With this series of factors as backdrop it is not surprising that
European socialists were among the first international actors to rejoice
in the Sandinist triumph and to offer material and political assistance to
the Sandinist government; that the murders of Guatemalan oposition
leaders, such as Manuel Colom Argueta, who had developed close ties to
various European social democratic leaders reaffirmed their interest in
the region; that some of them originally took a quite sympathetic view of
the Salvadoran insurrection; or that, as the conflict between Costa Rica
and Nicaragua became more open, they had to search for ways to balance
their commitments in the area.

Three different kinds of actors have played important roles in terms of
European socialist presence in the Central American crisis: governments
that at different points have been under the control of these political
forces, political parties and, finally, the Socialist International
itself. The social democratic forces of various European countries have

23 Perhaps the most prominent case was that of Hector Oqueli, member
of the Salvadoran MNR, who in the late seventies became a member of the
Secretariat in charge of Latin American affairs. Mr. Oqueli is at present
a prominent figure in El Salvador's Democratic Revolutionary Front, which
along with the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front constitutes part
of the armed oposition in that country: FDR-FMLN.

tended to rely on each one of these channels in different degrees.
Recounting all the instances of their activity in the ithsmus would be not
only too lenghty but also unnecessary for the purposes of this essay. I
will only recall some of the most important instances in order to
illuminate the different security perceptions which these actors brought
to bear in the context of the crisis.

How far we are from the indifference of 1954 becomes quite clear when
one focuses on the actions of European governments, in particular those
under the control of social democratic parties, in the context of the
present Central American conflict. Two types of activity deserve special
attention. The first one is related to the different programs of
assistance aimed at maintaining open the options of the Sandinist
revolution and the Salvadoran insurgents. European socialist governments
participated in the initial efforts to finance the reconstruction of the
Nicaraguan economy after the revolution. The socialist government of
France went so far as to provide the Sandinist regime with U.S.$ 15
millions in arms.24

Social democrats were also among the primary moving forces in the
launching of the dialogue started in San Jose, Costa Rica in September of
1984 which led to a new program of economic assistance to Central America
on the part of the European Economic Community. The levels of aid involved
in that program are quite limited, and the economic relations that Central

24 Walter LaFeber, "The Reagan Administration and Revolutions in
Central America1' in Political Science Ouarterlv Spring 1984. P.lO.

America maintains with the Europeans are not too different from those it
has with the United States in qualitative terms, 25 but their political
significance can not be overlooked. The program, for example, formally
included Nicaragua, in open disagreement with U.S. preferences which at
that point were clearly directed at isolating the Sandinist regime.

The second area of governmental activity refers to more political kinds
of support. The French socialist government was, again, particularly
active in this respect in the early stages of the crisis. In this case an
important example, not only for its own significance but also for the fact
that it constitutes one of the most controversial instances of EuropeanLatin American collaboration in the context of the crisis, is the joint
communiqu6 which that government issued with its Mexican counterpart in

August of 1981 regarding the civil war in El Salvador. In that communiqu6
both governments gave the Salvadoran FDR-FMLN the status of
"representative political forces" and asked that the frentes be a part to
any attempt to solve the civil war in that country. This represented the
high point in the participation of both the Mexican and the French
governments in the Salvadoran conflict. It was criticized by several Latin
American countries as intervention in the domestic affairs of that Central
American country. But it also served as the starting point for a series
of resolutions passed by the United Nations in the following years which
called on the Salvadoran government to negotiate with the frentes. In
1982, for example, the governments of France, Denmark, Greece and the
25 Victor Bulmer-Thomas, "Relaciones Econ6micas Entre Centroamkrica y
Europa Occidental", in Cuadernos Semestrales de Estados Unidos:
perspectiva latinoamericana Num.18, Second semester of 1985.

Netherlands sponsored one such resolution which called for talks before
the elections scheduled for that same year.26

Other examples of French actions that represented significant
departures of previous European attitudes in the area can also be pointed
out. Thus, another significant instance for us, since it involved a
reaction to U.S. activities in the area, was the offer made by President
Mitterand to help the Nicaraguan government remove the mines that had been
placed by the contras with the support of the intelligence services of the
superpower in the Gulf of Fonseca.

A final expression of disagreements at the governmental level between
the European socialist government and their North American counterpart was
related to the degree of support that the former gave to the process of
Contadora, initiated in early 1983 by Colombia, Mexico, Panama and
Venezuela as an alternative to the Reagan administration policies in
Central A m e r i ~ a .As~ ~a result of such support, for example, the European
governments have invited the Contadora governments to their meetings with
the Central Americans aimed at the establishment of the program for
economic cooperation referred to in previous pages.

Not only the governments but also the parties and the International

26 Frederick Tanner, "Un nuevo aspect0 en la solucidn del conflict0
en America Central: Europa y Contadora", in Cuadernos Semestrales de
latinoamericana , Num. 18, second semester of
Estados Unidos: ~ers~ectiva
1985.

27 Frederick Tanner, OD. cit.

itself have expressed their support for the Contadora process and
provided, for example through the activities of the Ebert foundation,
Western options for the Central American revolutionaries. But perhaps an
even more interesting aspect of the activities of these other nongovernmental actors is related to the role they have played in generating
and making public alternative diagnoses and policy prescriptions to deal
with the crisis. The most open differences with the U.S. interpretation of
the roots and potential solutions to the Central American crisis came, in
fact, to be presented at the level of party activity. Important political
figures of European social democracy presented impassionate arguments for
an alternative policy, which in some instances seemed to reflect a
positive, and almost idealized, view of the revolutionary processes that
were taking place in the region.

A case in point is that of Swedish Foreign Minister Pierre Schori's
book El desafio euroDeo en Centr~amBrica,~~
published in Sweden in 1981
and in Costa Rica the following year. Shori presents basic themes that
will dominate European social democratic visions of the crisis during its
early years in some of the clearest language ever used by these political
forces. A first component of the vision he presents is an awareness of the
historical roots of present conflicts and of the role on nationalism and
national liberation in them. "The history of the Caribbean- he states
early in his book- is the history of the fight of the empires against the
peoples of the region, as well as of the internal drive of those empires
to eliminate one another. But it is also the history of the struggle of
28 Pierre Schori OD. cit.

32

the Caribbean natives to liberate themselves from their foreign
This emphasis on nationalism and its impact on the Central
American revolutions will repeat itself, in very different tbnes in
practically all important statements that European social democrats will
make in relation to the crisis.30 Shori, however, goes farther than most
of those statements in linking the historical past of the region to
present problems. Thus, he finishes his first chapter with a series of
statements which could have come from forces much further to the left in
the political spectrum of either Europe or Central America:

Empire builders of the modern age seem to have
inherited many of the prejudices of the first
colonialists. They consider Latin Americans as
unable to determine their own destiny. They
firmly maintain that any effort of political
and economic emancipation feeds on foreign
countries and ideologies and that, as a result,
it is necessary to save these nations for the
"free world", even if this has to be done against
their will and by the force of arms. This is, in
great measure what puts the peoples of Central
America today in the eye of the storm.3 1

Throughout the book the references to the U.S. as the main obstacle to
the self determination of Central America and one of the main components
of the present crisis are almost permanent. It is in fact difficult to
choose quotes. What follows is almost a random selection:
29 Ibid. P.14.

30 See, for example, Fernando MorAn, "Europe's Role in Central
America: A Spanish Socialist View", in Andrew J. Pierre (Ed.): Third World
Instability: Central America as a Euro~eanAmerican Issue (New York:
Council on Foreign Relations, 1985).
31 Shori: OD. cit. P.21.

In those cases where the national puppets have
not been able to repress popular reivindications
for reform the new colonial power has not
vacillated in intervening directly. We saw it in
Guatemala in 1954 and we are seeing it this year
in El Salvador.32
The revolutionaries found much inspiration in the
rebels of previous generations. But the main motor
for their actions was, of course, the situation of
their own country and not the result of opinions
imported from Moscow or Havana. On the other hand,
measures and decisions taken in the United States,
the big neighbor of the Central Americans, have an
immense role.33
The shark has eaten many sardines throughout the
years. In the history of the U.S. Marine corps
180 cases of intervention between 1800 and 1934
are mentioned. . .34

...

communism is not and has never been an
important force in Latin America ...in practice only
a reactionary policy on the part of the United
States can create possibilities for communism ...
History clearly shows that Latin America's struggle
for liberation is not an extension of the East-West
confrontation. The majority of the peoples of
Central America do not know and are not likely to
want any communism. They want today what the
wanted seventy years ago: land and liberty.33
When are they going to understand that the
identification with the most reactionary regimes
of Latin America is counterproductive and that
a sustainable anti-Soviet strategy requires an
attempt to lay bridges to governments which

32 Ibid. P. 28.
33 Ibid. P. 37.

34 Ibid. P.43.
35 Ibid.

P. 94-95.

have popular support?36

The tone itself of such statements is interesting. It is hard to find
the same kind of language in other European social democratic statements
and it is doubtful that many among them would endorse the language used.
But the open contradiction that they announce with the interpretations of
the sources of instability that the Reagan administration brought to bear
in the conflict was widely shared in those

circle^.^' It is easy

to see

why the basic assumptions of the initial public statements of the U.S.
government, which tended to put the blame for the conflict on Soviet-Cuban
activities, was seen by European social democratic forces not only as
unrealistic but also as self-serving. And without accepting that basic
diagnose of the roots of crisis in Central America it was very difficult
for them to share the prescriptions proposed to deal with it. The emphasis
on military measures was thought to be misguided since it did not address
the real sources of the conflict; isolating Nicaragua was perceived as
short sighted, since that country was not seen as already a part of the
Soviet camp and as a result the best way to avoid that result was to keep
its options open within the west,38 etc.
36 Ibid. P. 210.
37 See, for example, the text of a document prepared under the
auspices of German and Dutch social democrats which was to be endorsed by
most European social democratic parlamentarians: The Central American
Crisis: A Euro~eanRes~onse(Amsterdam: Transnational Institute, 1984).
See also the critique of the Kissinger report presented by two influential
members of the British Parliament in Stuart Holland and Donald Anderson:
Kissin~er's KinEdom: A Counter Re~orton Central America (London:
Spokesman, 1984).
38 Ibid. P.11.

It must be stressed that these were points spoused not only by the left
wing of the movement. They represented a much wider consensus which in
fact went beyond the social democratic ranks in Europe. A final point
which made them all the more relevant for the topic of this essay was that
they represented disagreements with the U.S. government over means rather
than policy objectives. Wolf Grabendorff has adequately summarized the
complex mix of basic agreement in terms of the aims to be pursued and
disagreement on the best means to do achieve them that has characterized
the security perceptions of European social democrats, on the one hand,
and the Reagan administration, on the other. According to him, there is a
basic agreement among most European political forces

their North

American counterparts in relation to the following interests:

- to prevent the Central American countries from adhering to
the socialist bloc
- to avoid regional and internal instability due to
interstate or intrastate violence

- to guarantee economic cooperation through the support of
free market economies
- to further economic development and social justice through
bilateral and multilateral aid programs39
These shared interests, however, do not change the basic reality that
there are significant disagreements on the diagnoses of the crisis

39 Wolf Grabendorff, "Western European Perceptions of the Crisis in
Central America", in Wolf Grabendorff, Heinrich-W. Krumwiede and Jorg
Todt: Political Change in Central America: Internal and External
Dimensions (Boulder: Westview, 1984). P. 289.

preferred by these partners in the Atlantic Alliance. From the European
social democratic view the crisis is best characterized as

- a north-south problem in and of the Western Hemisphere;

-

a problem deeply rooted in the historical relationship of
the United States with its southern neighbors;

- a test case for the United States to come to terms with
the solution of its informal empire;

-

a test case for the Western powers to deal with
revolutionary change and self-determination in the Third
World;

-

a problem of how to restrain the military engagement of
the Soviet Union and/or radical Third World states;

- a problem of how to avoid a superpower confrontation in
the region and the resulting spillovers.40

As I have emphasized earlier in this essay, those different diagnoses
in turn lead to different emphases in terms of policy prescriptions. A
comparison of those proposals advanced by the European social democrats
with the policy preferences of the largest Latin American governments41
makes it very clear that they shared precisely those crucial points in
which they in turn disagreed with the North American government. During
the first few years of the Central American crisis European social
democrats seemed to be going in a direction which could satisfy the
expectations placed in them by many Latin American political actors. They
certainly contributed during those years to the basic Latin American

40 Wolf Grabendorff, "The Central American Crisis: Is there a Role
for Western Europe?" in Joseph Cirincione (Ed.): Central America and the
Western Alliance (New York: Holmes & Meier, 1985). P. 129.

41 See, for example, Carlos Rico, OD. cit.

objective of avoiding a situation in which the crisis could be placed in a
strict East-West context. After 1982, however, a perceptible change took
place in the Central American activities of the European social democrats
which cast severe doubts on the realism of those hopes. My concluding
remarks touch on these final topics.

5.- Final Considerations.

The high point of European social democratic interest in the Central
American crisis lasted a little more than three years. After 1982 a new
period was opened during which a gradual disentanglement on their part
was in progress. European attention was renewed with the efforts at
developing a program of economic cooperation launched with the San Jose
meeting of September of 1984.42 Such attention, however, had important
differences with the initial period of Western European commitment. It was
a governmental enterprise which included all governments of the EEC rather
than only those under social democratic control. Social democratic forces
themselves took an increasingly restrained attitude. The Spanish socialist
government, in particular, seemed constrained by an apparent desire to
keep good working relations with all its former colonies in the isthmus,
which brought it to a conscious effort not to "take sides" in the
conflict. Little by little the Nordic socialists became the most important
Western European alternatives for the Sandinist government and the
revolutionary movement in El Salvador.

42 Jose Miguel Insulza, "Europa, Centroamerica y la Alianza
Atlbntican, in Cuadernos Semestrales de Estados Unidos: ~ers~ectiva
latinoamericana, Num 18, second semester of 1985.

There are several resons for such a shift. They have to do with changes
in European politics, the activities undertaken by other governments in
relation to the conflict and the development of the Central American
crisis itself. Among the most important of the first set of changes was
the consolidation of Conservative rule in two important Western European
countries, Germany and Great Britain, and the increasing problems of the
Socialists in France. The first two were among the first European members
of the Atlantic Alliance to change their original policy of providing
options to the Sandinist regime within the West. In that sense, at least
part of the restraint exhibited after 1984 by the European social
democratic governments reflected the nature itself of the multilateral
exercise in which all of them participated starting that year.

The French were a good example of another interesting set of
circumstances: just as their relative lack of vital interests in Central
America had given them a freer hand to act in more "progressive" ways than
was the case in their own former colonies, it also made them less likely
to pay the price implied by opposition to the policy in their own country
and on the part of the U.S. government. Complicating matters in either one
of those arenas as a result of policies adopted in connection with a
relatively secondary issue in their agenda seemed unnecessary.

This brings us to our second set of developments. Actions by both the
United States government and those of Latin American countries in the
immediate vicinity of the conflict were important in limiting the

commitment of European social democrats. As regards the first one, the
displeasure of conservative North American thinkers with the activities of
the Western European socialists in connection with the Central American
crisis43 was not a secret, even at the beginning of the Reagan
administration. The Administration itself gave clear signs of concern. In
February 1981 Ambassador Eagleburger visited the main Western European
capitals in an effort to sell the U.S. government's views on the crisis.
The following year a National Security Council memorandum was leaked to
the North American press in which the effort to change the attitudes of
the Socialist International in connection to the Central American crisis
was presented as one of the key priorities in the Administration's Central
American agenda. As the priority assigned by the Reagan administration to
the sub-regional conflict became increasingly clear the perception of
potential costs to be paid by those forces that insisted on developing
alternative policies also grew.

It is of course very difficult, with the information available in
public sources at this point, to prove any instances of open pressure on
these government or political groups or to establish clear lines of
causality between their changes of behavior and U.S. displeasure. But that
both such displeasure and the U.S. government's intention to correct its
sources were well known to the parties involved is difficult to deny.

Taking a more relaxed attitude on the part of Western Europe's
43 See, for example, Irving Kristol, "Should Europe be Concerned
About Central America?", in Andrew J. Pierre (Ed.): OD. cit.

political forces was made easier as a consequence of the actions of those
Latin American governments that became identified as the "Contadora
group". In a sense, the existence of the Latin American effort and the
commitment of key Latin American countries to sustaining it made it
relatively easier for the European governments to simply transform their
own efforts into support for the regional initiative. And, as with many
other such instances of formal support many times its concrete expressions
were quite limited.

As regards the evolution of the Central American crisis itself, two
developments seem particularly relevant. The first one was the increased
Soviet support for the Nicaraguan revolution and the radicalization of the
process itself. As had been the case with the Cuban revolution, many
social democrats saw both as almost inevitable results of the pressure put
on the revolutionary regime by the U.S. But whatever its causes the
result itself, with all its implications, remained. And even as some
social democrats still struggled to keep some space open for the
Nicaraguans, the more open changes of other European governments
significantly changed the context in which their alternative policies had
to be pursued.

The attitudes of other European political forces- in this case the
Christian democratic parties of key countries such as, again, Germanywere also particularly relevant in the context of the second Central
American development: the seeming consolidation of the Duarte government
in El Salvador.

But whatever the reasons for the dampening of European social
democratic activities in Central America, their apparent restraint brought
about a clear sobering of Latin American expectations regarding their
potential role as counterweights of U.S. presence in the sub-region at the
political level. Such revision of previous hopes has centered on two kinds
of considerations. In the first place, the already mentioned limited
extent of their economic commitment, in particular when compared with the
kinds of resources that the Reagan Administration has been willing to
involve in support of its own policy preferences. Secondly, the
increasingly critical tone of the evaluation that many of those social
democratic parties have tended to make of the internal politics of the
Nicaraguan revolution, which do not seem to take into account the national
emergency created for that country by the low intensity warfare directed
from Washington. It would seem as if these European political forces were
consciously or unconsciously playing into the hands of precisely one of
the objectives of such strategy -to bring about an increase in Nicaragua's
international isolation. Such critical tone increased with the failure of
the efforts undertaken during the 1984 Rio de Janeiro meeting of the
International to bring the Sandinists and then contra leader Arturo Cruz
to agree on terms that would guarantee the latter's participation in the
Nicaraguan electoral process of that same year.

Two final elements must be included in the evaluation of the European
social democratic retreat. The first one points to the fact that the
Central American revolutionary forces still enjoy the sympathy of

important segments of European social democratic constituencies, as the
reception given to the Nicaraguan President and Vice-President in their
European tours amply shows. As a result of this, even if they limit their
support of the Sandinist revolution they still can not publicly support
the policies pursued by the Reagan administration. This in turn is
important for those forces which oppose them within the U.S. and which can
point to European disagreements as one proof of their mistaken nature. In
a sense, we seem to face a "juego a cuatro bandas" in which European
public opinion support limits the public statements of their governments,
which in turn affects the domestic North American political debate in ways
which limit the North American administration's ability to act in
accordance with its own preferences.

The second point which must be included in our evaluation is in turn
related to the changing political circumstances of key South American
countries where four factors that were touched on in previous sections of
this essay may help to bring a renewed European social democratic presence
in that part of the continent. First, there is a stronger tradition of
both social democratic and European presence in South America than is the
case in the ithsmus. Secondly, European economic and other interests
involved in that part of the world are considerably more important. Third,
significant sectors of those countries' left have tended to move in an
increasingly social democratic direction. Finally, the United States seem
to be willing to tolerate a greater degree of "heterodox" behavior there
than seems to be the case in what it clearly still considers its own
Mediterranean.

Part I1 of the History of the Renewed Presence of European Social
Democracy in Latin America, in sum, may have to be written from a Southern
Cone perspective, now that Part I seems to have ended in a clearly anticlimactic note . . . perhaps the story will include more adventurous turns in
that second installment.

